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When Jennifer Thompson picked Ronald Cot-ton—suspect number five—from a line-up, shewas “absolutely certain” she had identified the
man who raped her in July 1984. She said she knew that
she was right because, dur-
ing the rape, she had stud-
ied his eyes, his voice, his
height, and even the shape
of his ears. She was deter-
mined to identify him later
if she survived. Thomp-
son’s repeated strong and
confident identification of Cotton during pretrial pro-
ceedings and at trial led to his 1985 conviction and sen-
tence of life imprisonment plus 50 years. 
In 1995, DNA evidence proved Thompson’s identifica-
tion to be wrong. She erred because her memory of the
rapist was skewed by suggestive pretrial identification
procedures: working with police on a composite sketch of
the suspect inclined her to identify Cotton’s mug shot,
which bore a resemblance to her assailant; selecting his
mug shot primed her to pick him out of a line-up; and
picking him out of the line-up led her to identify him
with absolute certainty at trial. Investigators’ positive
reactions to her repeated identification of Cotton further
reinforced Thompson’s misguided certainty that he was
her rapist.1
The Ronald Cotton story is far from unique in its tale of
unreliable eyewitness confidence and the inaccuracy of an
identification leading to a wrongful conviction. Of the 239
DNA exonerations documented by late 2009, 73 percent—
or 175 cases—involved positive eyewitness testimony—ulti-
mately proved to be erroneous.2 This should not be sur-
prising. In 1937 John Wigmore drew attention to the many
problems of eyewitness identification in The Science of Judi-
cial Proof.3 Reliance on an eyewitness’s confidence misdi-
rects law enforcement
officials, inappropriately
bolsters the confidence of
other witnesses, negates
credible exculpatory evi-
dence, and contributes to
the over-reliance on eyewit-
ness testimony by jurors and
many judges. A major difficulty is that frequently judges
feel their hands are tied by a legal precedent that has con-
tinued to vex courts across the country.
Origins of a precedent
A trilogy of cases under U.S. v. Wade, decided in 1967,
also recognized the frailties of eyewitness identification.
The foundation of the trilogy was the Wade Court’s
acknowledgment of the “high incidence of miscarriage of
justice” caused by mistaken eyewitness identifications,
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highly regarded researchers on the underlying science bearing on eyewitness
identification http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03/06/60minutes/
main4848039.shtml.) Or see the New York Times best seller, Jennifer
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2009). 
2. The Innocence Project, Understand the Causes: Eyewitness Identification,
available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-
Misidentification.php
3. John H. Wigmore, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF (3d ed. 1937) at Part
III, pp. 499-632.
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and its recognition that suggestive
pretrial identifications can taint later
identifications. 4 The Court held that
where there has been a suggestive
pretrial identification, any subse-
quent in-court identification must
have an independent basis to be
admissible. In applying this test, the
Court suggested several factors that
may be considered: 
for example, the prior opportunity to
observe the alleged criminal act, the
existence of any discrepancy between
any pre-lineup description and the
defendant’s actual description, any
identification prior to lineup of
another person, the identification by
picture of the defendant prior to the
lineup, failure to identify the defen-
dant on a prior occasion, and the lapse
of time between the alleged act and the
lineup identification.
However, when the Supreme Court
returned to the subject in the 1972
case of Neil v. Biggers, it restated the
factors, adding a new one—“the level
of certainty demonstrated by the wit-
ness at the confrontation.”5 This new
factor appears to have been the prod-
uct of the Bigger Court’s “common
sense” intuition rather than being
based on Wade, any other Court
precedent, or, indeed, on any empiri-
cal evidence. 
While the Wade Court did not
attribute its list of reliability factors
to any source, the factors appear to
have originated in a book by Patrick
M. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in
Criminal Cases,6 which the Court ref-
erenced repeatedly throughout its
opinion. Strikingly, however, Wall
cautioned against the use of eyewit-
ness certainty or confidence, warn-
ing that an eyewitness “may be sub-
jected to so many suggestive
influences by the police that at the
trial he will make ‘a positive identifi-
cation which no amount of subjec-
tive cross-examination will be able to
shake.’” Thus, the introduction of
confidence as a factor in Biggers con-
flicted with the very foundation of
Wade: the recognition that an eyewit-
ness is unlikely to “go back on his
word” once he has identified the
defendant.
No scientific basis
In the nearly four decades since Big-
gers, peer-reviewed journals have
published hundreds of scientific
studies on the accuracy of eyewitness
identification. These studies confirm
what Wall had concluded in 1965:
that the correlation between eyewit-
ness confidence and accuracy is at
best a weak relationship and is con-
tingent on any number of situational
factors, some of which can be manip-
ulated, even unintentionally, by
police or other witnesses.7
Professor Gary Wells, one of the
leading experts on eyewitness identi-
fication, and co-author Deah Quinli-
van, recently published an extensive
review of 30 years of eyewitness iden-
tification research, showing that the
confidence factor is central in
explaining unreliability.8
Research also shows that the rela-
tionship between confidence and
accuracy is alterable in predictable
ways by the investigation and trial
process. Nancy Steblay, for example,
demonstrated the consistency of the
finding that—as with Jennifer
Thompson in the Ronald Cotton
case—eyewitnesses’ confidence is
affected by feedback from the police
or other witnesses.9 This simple “con-
firmatory feedback” tends to pro-
duce robust effects on eyewitnesses’
assessment of the observed event,
including exaggerated reporting of
their confidence in the identifica-
tion, the attention they paid to the
suspect, and even the length of time
that they viewed the suspect. Thus,
because of the occurrence of confir-
matory feedback over the course of
an investigation, the relationship
between confidence and accuracy is
likely to get weaker, rather than
stronger, before trial. 
In a recently published study
involving 14 witnesses to an actual
armed robbery, the findings again
supported the general scientific con-
clusion that witness confidence is not
a reliable predictor of accuracy of
recall.10 In that study, the witness’s
recollections were checked against
store video cameras that recorded
the entire event. While about 84 per-
cent of the information the witnesses
recalled was correct, the accuracy-
confidence correlation was “mod-
est,” prompting the authors to
caution that while “confidence may
be used as a cautious indicator for
accuracy during police investigations
. . . , it should never be allowed as evi-
dence for memory accuracy in the
courtroom.”11
Multiple studies have also consis-
tently failed to find ways to improve
this relationship. For example,
although collaborating with another
witness has been found to be associ-
ated with higher confidence as well as
higher accuracy, the relationship has
been found to be lower when
responses were made in public, which
of course is necessary in this context.12
Even repeated questioning, with-
out any confirmatory feedback, can
lead to higher reported confidence
over time.13 Thus, if an eyewitness is
asked several times over an extended
period to confirm an identification
she has made, her confidence in the
accuracy of her identification is
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greater at the end of the period than
it was at the beginning. Additionally,
in situations where social pressures
or incentives to perform correctly
are high – such as in a trial setting –
eyewitnesses try especially hard to
“get it right.”14
In short, over the last 30 years,
research has convincingly established
that the “common sense” Biggers con-
fidence factor is generally unsuitable
for determining the reliability of eye-
witness testimony. Under conditions
specific to a trial, confidence is likely
to be an even less reliable predictor
of accuracy.
Contaminating 
criminal proceedings
As the Court was aware in Wade, con-
sidering confidence as a factor in
determining the reliability of eyewit-
ness testimony can adversely affect
the investigation, pretrial, trial, and
appellate stages of a criminal case. At
the investigation and pretrial stages,
the factor shapes decisions about
whom or what to investigate and
whether to prosecute. Whenever an
identification is made, police rou-
tinely are instructed to document the
confidence level of the eyewitness. If
the witness expresses some degree of
uncertainty about what she witnessed,
the police may redouble their efforts
to develop additional evidence of the
suspect’s guilt or may abandon some
avenues of investigation; if the witness
expresses a high degree of certainty,
the police more often will curtail their
investigation or thereafter focus
entirely on the suspect identified.15 In
both cases, the police may be inap-
propriately narrowing the investiga-
tions, because they are assuming,
contrary to scientific fact, that cer-
tainty equates with accuracy. Such
misdirected investigations frequently
lead to wrongful convictions.
Prosecutors are also subject to this
kind of misdirection. For example,
in cases that depend heavily upon
the testimony of an eyewitness, pros-
ecutors may decide not to charge
the actual perpetrator because an
eyewitness cannot express sufficient
confidence in the identification.
Conversely, a prosecutor may pursue
a case primarily because of the eye-
witness’s certainty about an identifi-
cation and ignore other evidence
that raises doubt.
At the trial stage, courts often
appear to favor the testimony of
highly certain eyewitnesses, in the
process subtly encouraging witnesses
to express greater confidence so
their testimony will be admitted and
they will not disappoint the prosecu-
tors, the police, even the victims of
the crimes. Jurors also tend to give
more weight to eyewitness testimony
than is justified, particularly focusing
on the confidence with which the
eyewitness identifies the defendant. 
Similarly, based on the same false
assumptions, some judges deny
motions to allow expert witnesses or
refuse to issue cautionary jury
instructions about eyewitness identifi-
cations. They reason, as the Supreme
Court did in Biggers, that lay jurors
can intuitively assess the reliability of
eyewitness testimony. Part of this rea-
soning is based on the assumption
that judicial instructions alone will
sensitize jurors to the problems of
eyewitness identification, including
the eyewitness’ confidence, but
empirical research indicates that
such instructions are likely to be inef-
fective.16 Finally, the presence of a
highly confident eyewitness may lead
experts and other witnesses to testify
more confidently, themselves, forti-
fied by the eyewitness’ confidence.
The problem for courts
Although many appellate courts
unquestioningly apply the Biggers fac-
tors, others have long been strug-
gling to reconcile the chasm between
what Biggers requires and what is sci-
entifically sound. Some courts have
circumvented the flawed standard
altogether by addressing the problem
of eyewitness testimony under stan-
dards based on their own state consti-
tutions. For example, courts in
Massachusetts, New York, and Wis-
consin have relied upon their state
constitutions to adopt per se rules
that exclude all eyewitness testimony
obtained using unnecessarily sugges-
tive procedures. Additionally, courts
in Michigan and Utah have adopted
tests under their constitutions that
specifically exclude the consideration
of the confidence factor. 
Other courts have sought to blunt
the impact of eyewitness testimony
admitted under the standard by per-
mitting experts to testify about the
scientifically demonstrated unrelia-
bility of such testimony.17 For exam-
ple, in a case involving suggestive
pretrial procedures and the testi-
mony of two confident eyewitnesses,
the Arizona Supreme Court ruled
that the trial court erred in refusing
to permit expert testimony on eye-
witness identification, reasoning that 
Dr. Loftus’ testimony and some experi-
mental data indicate that there is no
relationship between the confidence
which a witness has in his or her identi-
fication and the actual accuracy of that
identification. . . . We cannot assume
that the average juror would be aware
of the variables concerning identifica-
tion and memory about which Dr. Lof-
tus was qualified to testify.18
Other appellate courts simply
downplay the confidence factor in
affirming a conviction, reasoning
that an eyewitness’s confidence is
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F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hines,
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influenced by the suggestive proce-
dure itself. That is, unlike the other
four elements of the Biggers test, the
eyewitness’s degree of certainty can
be recorded only after the suggestive
procedure has been used. Thus, the
degree of certainty can be “engen-
dered by the suggestive element
itself.”
Still other jurisdictions have tried
to address the problem outside the
courts. For example, the U.S.
Department of Justice and Illinois,
New Jersey, North Carolina, and
Texas created commissions that rec-
ommended adoption of more scien-
tific and less sugges-
tive techniques for
conducting lineups
and photospreads.
Still other jurisdic-
tions, including Wis-
consin, have enacted
or are considering
enacting laws that
standardize scientifi-
cally validated identifi-
cation procedures.19
The precedent
perseveres
Litigants in both fed-
eral and state courts
have challenged iden-
tifications as violations
of due process. Many
have petitioned the
U.S. Supreme Court
for review, but the
Court routinely
refuses to hear chal-
lenges to the Biggers
test. In one such case,
Ledbetter v. Connecticut,
the Connecticut Supreme Court
upheld use of the Biggers confidence
factor while simultaneously recogniz-
ing that it was contrary to scientific
research.20 Ledbetter petitioned the
U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari
review, and an amicus brief signed by
21 leading experts in the field was
submitted on his behalf.21 Among
other things, the brief drew attention
to the large body of scientific
research that directly challenges the
confidence factor. 
The Court rejected Ledbetter’s
petition in 2006, and other such
challenges since then. The result is
that a flawed standard continues to
privilege a factor of reliability that
science and experience counsel
should be abandoned. At the same
time, challenges to the confidence
factor continue unabated in state
and federal courts.22
Time for science to prevail?
When it was adopted by the Supreme
Court in 1972, the Biggers confidence
factor was based upon widely shared
“common sense” beliefs and under-
standings about a direct relationship
between the confidence of an eyewit-
ness and the accuracy of his or her
identification. Without the benefit of
scientific research, the Court thus
fashioned a constitutional standard
that comported with an intuitive
understanding generally shared by
judges, lawyers, and the general pub-
lic. The common sense origin of the
decision’s confidence factor likely
accounts for both its longevity and its
power to do great harm. The deci-
sion may have seemed to make sense
at the time, but experience and sci-
entific research have now shown that
it was wrong. 
More than 75 years ago, Justice
Brandeis noted that in “cases involv-
ing the Federal Constitution, . . .
[t]he Court bows to the lessons of
experience and the force of better
reasoning, recognizing that the
process of trial and error, so fruitful in
the physical sciences, is appropriate
also in the judicial function.”23 Is it
time for the Supreme Court to finally
yield to judicial concern backed by
solid science and overturn the confi-
dence criterion in Biggers? g
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